Knowledge in a Social World (KSW) is Alvin Goldman's sustained treatment of social epistemology. As in his previous, >individualistic' epistemology, Goldman's lodestar is the idea that it is the truth-aptness of certain processes/methods which marks them out for our epistemic approval. Here, I focus on issues concerning the framework of KSW: Goldman's claim that a correspondence theory of truth is favoured/required by his veritistic social epistemology (VSE); and the issue of whether a VSE of the sort Goldman elaborates and defends shouldn't be (not replaced but) supplemented by more procedural or >justification-centred' considerations.
Introduction
While he has made substantial contributions in other areas of philosophy, 1 it is of course for contributions to epistemology that Alvin Goldman is best known. Until recently, Goldman has tended to follow epistemological tradition in focusing on individuals B on what it is for an individual to possess some piece of propositional knowledge, on the nature of epistemic justification, and so on. With Knowledge in a Social World (KSW), however, Goldman has now given us a sustained treatment of social epistemology (SE).
2 Now, as perhaps befits the topic, >social epistemology' applies to quite a diverse, and sometimes competing, range of issues and projects (see, e.g., Goldman 2001b and 2002b ).
Goldman's own lodestar here, however, as in his non-social epistemology, is the idea that it is the 1 Including action theory, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and political and legal theory.
2 It should be noted that many of the main themes of KSW were first presented in a series of Goldman's more recent papers. (These are really too numerous to mention: see KSW ix.)
epistemic. 6 Nor does Goldman think that such practices are to be evaluated in terms of their intrinsic features; the right approach, rather, is a consequentialist one. Specifically for Goldman, the right/good social practices are those which lead to knowledge on the part of its users, where knowledge is understood Ain the >weak' sense of true belief@ (5; 23ff.). Even supposing some form of consequentialism is the right one, why's that the proper evaluative standard? Because that is the over-arching epistemic goal: we want true belief, both because we are intrinsically curious creatures, and because where our beliefs make a practical difference (some don't), ceteris paribus it's true belief, not false, that helps us to satisfy our goals (e.g., 3, 69; pace, e.g., Stich
1990, Chapter 5).
Nor will just any notion of what truth is do for Goldman. Specifically, he spends substantial time addressing both (in Chapter 1) >veriphobes' and (Chapter 2) some specific approaches to truth which he rejects B instrumentalist, relativist, epistemic, and deflationary theories. Each of these approaches is problematic, Goldman argues, and none does justice to the Athe basic correspondence idea that what makes sentences or propositions true are real-world truth makers@ (68). It's this Athe root idea,@ Goldman says B the idea Athat truth involves a relation to reality@ (59) --and that idea alone, that's required for the veritistic project of KSW (68). Only a notion of truth that is broadly in the correspondence tradition, according to Goldman, does justice to our Aintuitive understanding@ of truth (42), makes sense of our having Ainterests, both intrinsic and extrinsic, in acquiring knowledge (true belief) and avoiding error@ (69), and legitimizes a veritistic approach to SE.
Veritistic Social Epistemology and >the Basic Correspondence Idea'
Now, there are no doubt those who, in spite of Goldman's arguments in Chapter 1, it's that they seem simply to >get off on wrong track', confusing from the outset truth with sui generis things: on the face of it, utility and truth for example needn't coincide (there are many useless truths, and many useful falsehoods). So too for truth and justified/warranted belief: many of the things we justifiedly believe are false; and there are many truths which, because of our present ignorance, we would not be justified in believing. Moreover, as Goldman points out, many of these views seem actually to require an antecedent handle on the notion of truth: Thus, though justified belief and truth seem to come apart, it might be suggested that this isn't so of truth and what would be justifiedly believed in the ideal epistemic situation. 9 Arguably, though, the notion of truth is needed to define (ideal) justification; if truth-conducivity isn't built into the understanding of (ideal) justification, however, we're back to the problem of divergence B for why suppose that what we'd be justified in believing, even in the limit, would be true? 10 7 Also, there are no doubt those who'd want to insist that truth --/the veritistic properties of various social practices --is somehow too >remote' for Goldman's VSE to be feasible. I return to this idea in the next section.
8 E.g., Shapin (1994) uses >knowledge' to mean something like >accepted belief'; this makes >SE' an exercise in intellectual (/socio-political/etc.) history (see KSW, 7; and Goldman 2001a, 164ff.) .
9 This is basically Putnam's Peircian suggestion, discussed at KSW, 46.
10 There is an alternative way of understanding (at least certain of) these >competing' notions of truth: that they are not attempts to define >truth', but attempts to offer a replacement for it (see 44, n. 1). Such a view might be motivated by, say, the thought that the replacement notion is more amenable to our pursuit of it, whereas >get truth' is not so easily operationalized, so to speak. I return to this way of thinking in the next But is that so? Again, I think that Goldman's criticisms of epistemic, instrumentalist, etc., theories of truth are on the mark, and that they don't respect >the basic correspondence idea'. (At any rate, I won't be arguing to the contrary here.) What's less clear to me is whether Goldman's own preferred approach to truth is, in this regard, really superior to deflationary views.
Of course, there are different theories that get grouped under the general >deflationist'
heading. As Goldman puts it, though, what they have in common B what makes them all >deflationist' B is that they all involve the denying Athat sentences using the word >true' involve the predication of a property (or a >substantive' property) to propositions or anything else@ (51).
Thus, on Quine's >disquotationalism', attributing truth to the sentence, >Snow is white', is no different from attributing whiteness to snow; Athe adjective >true' is dispensable when attributed to sentences that are explicitly before us@ (1987: 214) . Where >true' really earns its stripes is when we want to talk about sentences not available to us (AThe final sentence Churchill uttered was true@), when it's too cumbersome to actually token them (AThe longest sentence ever uttered is true@), or when we want to generalize over sentences (AEvery sentence of the form, >P or not-P', is true@). Even so, for Quine the distinctiveness of >true' is not that it gives us, so to speak, something new to say B a way of picking out some substantive property over and above, say, snow's being white, etc.; rather, it gives us a new (sometimes better) way of saying what we already could (in principle, anyway), by replacing talk of the world with logically equivalent talk about words (Williams 2001: 141) .
In the same way, on Horwich's (1990) >minimalist' theory (MT), the correct theory of the meaning of >true' consists in all instances of the equivalence schema, (T) <P> is true iff P.
And a person's understanding of the truth predicate consists in his being disposed to accept any instance of (T).
Horwich thinks that this minimal theory suffices to explain what needs explaining. For instance, it explains why, from the sentences,
(1) >Everything Cassie says is true', and (2) >Cassie says that snow is white', it follows, given (MT), that (3) >Snow is white'.
So, he thinks, there is no need to search for any >deeper' theory of truth (which is just as well, Horwich thinks, since such a search would fail to turn up anything).
Now, I'm not going to argue that either of these deflationary views is correct; while I'm not sure that the situation is quite as dire as Goldman makes it out to be (54-9), both Quine's and
Horwich's views face real difficulties. The present point is that it's not clear that Goldman's (DS) does a better job than either of these theories of respecting Athe basic correspondence idea that what makes sentences or propositions true are real-world truth makers@ (68).
In the final pages of his discussion of truth (66-8) Goldman suggests the following way of making his (DS) compatible with a deflationary view of truth (supposing that any technical problems facing the latter could be overcome): As Goldman says, there are a number of distinct projects that might cited under the heading, >a theory of truth'. Among these are: attempts to give the meaning of a specific piece of language, >true'; and attempts to say something about the nature of truth itself (41, 66; cf. Horwich 1990: 37-8 and Kirkham 1992 : Chapter 1). Now, Horwich's or Quine's view might turn out to be the correct semantic theory B the correct theory of the predicate, >true'. The >deflationary' aspect of these views consists in their authors' declining the invitation to give a theory of the nature of truth itself; and on that matter it may turn out that (DS) is the right way to go. Hence:
[E]ven if some form of deflationismYcan surmount its obstacles and be rendered fully attractive, this would not force us to relinquish the basic correspondence idea that what makes sentences or propositions true are real-world truth makers. (68) Surely, though, the deflationist will respond that the only reason Goldman's (DS) doesn't face such troubles itself is because it is too much a Asketch@ of a theory of truth. 11 Goldman writes that Athe crucial feature of the correspondence theory that distinguishes it from its competitors is its claim that the truth concept involves truth-makers: worldly entities of some sort that make propositions (or other truth-bearers) true@ (61). But Horwich, for example, regards the thought that (crudely put) nothing is true but that the world makes it so to be Ajust about the only [sort of] uncontroversial fact to be found@ in discussions of truth (1990: 126) ; and he thinks that this fact is just one of a family of closely related ideas which grow out of Athe innocuous idea that whenever a sentence or proposition is true, it is true because something in the world is a certain way --something typically external to the sentence or proposition@ (ibid.: 110-111). ((DS), on this view, is merely a harmless generalization from instances of (T).) Quine too thinks that the correspondence theorist Ais right that truth should hinge on reality, and it does. No sentence is true but reality makes it so@ (1971: 10).
According to Goldman, deflationists' saying such things is Amusic to the ears of a correspondence theorist@ (67); but should it be? As I read it, the disagreement between Goldman, on the one hand, and Horwich and Quine, on the other, is not over Athe basic correspondence idea that what makes sentences or propositions true are real-world truth makers@ (68). The disagreement, rather, concerns the prospects of turning this >basic correspondence idea' into something worth calling a theory of truth. 12 For (DS) to represent an explanatory advance over the (uncontroversial) >basic correspondence idea', the deflationist is liable to say, Goldman needs 11 Goldman imagines some philosophers objecting that the very idea of description presupposes that of truth (64). A (to my mind) more serious worry would be that the idea of correct description, as used in (DS), brings truth in through the back door, as it were.
12 As Goldman notes (60), Alston (1996) is careful not to call his >minimal realist' account (whereby a statement is true iff what it says to be the case actually is the case) a correspondence theory proper.
to provide (i.a.) theories of >descriptive content' and >descriptive success' (of a content's >fitting reality'); and he must do so without invoking the notion of truth (cf. Horwich 1990: 113).
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But don't we need a correspondence theory of truth in order to do justice to our interest in the truth -both for its own sake, and because it helps us achieve our goals? Again, that's not so clear. What is uncontroversial is that, for both intrinsic and extrinsic reasons, we want it to be the case that, to a first approximation, we believe that p just in case p (where 'p', typically, will refer to some worldly state of affairs): we want to believe that a particular food in poisonous if it is (but, epistemically anyway, not otherwise); we want to know whether it was disease, a meteor, or some other thing that led to the extinction of the dinosaurs; etc. Uncontroversial too, when taken on its own, is the summarizing of all of this with the claim that we have both an intrinsic and an extrinsic interest in the truth, where it's presumed that this interest is an interest in having our beliefs be appropriately connected with reality. The controversy, once again, is whether this claim is one the vindication of which rests upon discerning the nature of truth (along correspondence lines), or whether we should say instead that that which it summarizes needs no vindicating in the first place.
It bears emphasizing that none of this undercuts the larger project of VSE, or Goldman's specific version thereof. That, in fact, is the point: insofar as Athe tenability of [the basic
correspondence idea] is all that is required for the veritistic epistemology [developed in KSW]@ (68), that that idea doesn't favor a correspondence theory of truth over deflationism (supposing it doesn't) hardly threatens VSE. 14 On the contrary, inasmuch as we've yet to be presented with a complete and satisfactory correspondence theory, that it doesn't require such a theory actually brightens the prospects for Goldman's VSE.
Knowledge, Justification, and the Pursuit of Truth
If the aspiration to truth strikes some as immodest, a notable feature of Goldman's KSW is that, in another respect, it's strikingly modest: contrary to how knowledge is usually treated within the North American analytic tradition, Goldman treats of knowledge (only) in the weak sense of true belief. For a couple of reasons, this is notable, and possibly worrisome. Longino (1994) argues that a scientific belief is justified (and so a candidate for knowledge) to the extent that it results from the application of >objective' methods, where >objective' methods are explicitly characterized in terms of certain features of the relevant social practices B whether they there are genuinely public, allow for critical interaction, exhibit equality of intellectual authority among diverse perspectives, and so on (1994, 153).
On either of these views, knowledge itself B in general, and not just when it comes to SE B is deeply social. To be clear: this is not for ontogenetic reasons B because, as a matter of fact, the conditions which enable us to come to know include social conditions B but because knowledge requires justified/warranted belief, and the truth conditions for a statement of the form, >S is justified in believing that p', make ineliminable reference to social factors or conditions. One might worry, then, that in focussing on knowledge in the weak sense of true belief, Goldman has effectively side-stepped what has seemed to some to be a --if not the --route to an epistemology that's deeply social, much more deeply social than Goldman's KSW makes it out to be.
Having raised some worries about Goldman's taking knowledge in the weak sense to be his target, let me say that I think they're actually misplaced. --Not because there aren't these problems with focussing merely on true belief, but because, and contrary to what Goldman himself suggests, there is a sense in which it is incorrect to think that his concern is really just with >weak knowledge'. belief from (genuine) knowledge (e.g., Goldman 1976) , and that it constitutes the proper justification condition on knowing (e.g., Goldman 1979 Goldman , 1988 .
Of course, both of these claims B that reliabilism is the right approach to knowledge, and that it's the right approach to justification B are controversial. But they're not controversial for Goldman! So it's not at all clear that, by Goldman's own (reliabilist) lights, the knowledge with which he's concerned in KSW is knowledge in the >weak' sense of, simply, true belief.
Granted, in the case of social processes, the relevant practices/processes won't always supervene simply on properties of the subject; 18 in picturesque terms, they won't always be their reliability (or not) is unaffected by their >location'.
Does the presence of this justification condition make knowledge itself interestingly social? Does it show that the edifice of traditional epistemology needs serious reworking? Not that I can see. The feature of, say, Cohen's view that makes knowledge itself interestingly social, is that the truth conditions of >S knows that p' make explicit mention of social facts: S doesn't know that p (/S's belief that p isn't justified) if socially determined standards aren't met.
Whereas, in Goldman's case, the requirements for knowledge (/justified belief) with respect to beliefs arising from social processes is the same as they always are B S doesn't know that p (/S's belief that p isn't justified) unless that belief is produced (/sustained) by reliable processes.
Granted, none of the arguments of KSW require that reliabilism be correct. What making explicit the implicit reliabilist condition explicit does do, however, is to show that KSW may be much more continuous, both with Goldman's own previous work and with the epistemological tradition, than Goldman himself suggests.
Even so, Goldman does wish to avoid talking his target in KSW to be anything other than weak knowledge. He gives two reasons for this. First, because he wishes to speak to SE, and wants to avoid getting drawn into the tangled epistemological topic of what constitutes knowledge in the 'strong' sense. More importantly, Goldman says, his view is that "people's dominant epistemic goal…is to obtain true belief, pure and simple" (24). Of course, the "usual route" to true belief might be the obtaining of evidence, say; but the value of such evidence is wholly instrumental: we want it only because (we think) it will lead us to true belief (ibid.).
20
19 ABoth [individual and social epistemology] would seek to identify and assess processes, methods or practices in terms of their contributions --positive or negative --to the production of true belief. Individual epistemology would identify and evaluate psychological processes that occur within the epistemic subject. Social epistemology would identify and evaluate social processes by which epistemic subjects interact with other agents who exert causal influence on their beliefs.@ (2001b, Section 2).
20 And in a later paper: AThe theory [of KSW] centres on knowledge B in the sense of >true belief' B rather than on justification, although the latter inevitably plays a role as a means to truth@ (Goldman 2002c: 186;  there is a problem lurking here.
Above, we saw that classical epistemology is concerned with knowledge, in the sense of (at least) justified/warranted belief. Nor is the inclusion of the justification condition gratuitous:
for even if all we >really' care about, in the end, is correct information (true beliefs) about the world, and even if that's all that our getting by in the world requires, justification is supposed to be what helps get us there. As Goldman says, a B even the --guiding question of >classical epistemology' is, AHow can an individual engage in cognitive activity so as to arrive at true belief and avoid false belief?@ (2001b: Section 2).
However, as critics of epistemic externalism are constantly pointing out, injunctions such as, Ause reliable methods@ (e.g.), are no help at all if what you're wondering about is how to maximize truth and minimize falsehood among your beliefs. Hence at least one common rationale for the inclusion of the justification condition: it constitutes a more tractable, proximal goal; it's often hard to know when we've got the truth, but less hard to know when we've got justified belief; and if all goes well, in pursuing justified belief we're getting closer to knowledge as well.
Thus motivated, the need for justification is the need for (what's usually called) an >internalistic' construal thereof. Whereas, insofar as Goldman has an implicit justification condition at work in KSW, it's reliabilist (hence, externalist). Not that reliabilism is therefore the wrong account of knowledge, or even of justification. Goldman can say that the demand to know whether we've got knowledge, or to know how to get more, is meta-epistemological, and shouldn't affect our understanding of knowledge (/justification) itself (cf. 25, note 16). Fair enough; but whether or not we see an internalistic sort of justification as required for knowledge per se, or as something that is independently desirable, one might insist that it is desirable nonetheless.
cf. 2001c). Both in KSW and in his 2002b, Goldman's positive comments on justification -as contrasting with the insistence that it is valuable only because it is instrumental to true belief --occur within his
Returning now to KSW, one common/natural worry about Goldman's VSE, even among veriphiles, concerns its feasibility B that is, our ability actually to employ veritistic norms. For suppose we agree that it's (reliably produced) true belief we want from our socio-epistemic practices; how exactly, and how often, are we actually going to be in a position to determine how well we're doing on this score? This worry, note, is not an especially sceptical or >pessimistic' one (cf. 80-1): what's at issue is not whether our faculties, in general, issue in true beliefs B surely they do (Athere goes a squirrel@); and surely, when they don't, we're often in a position to see that things have gone wrong (AI was wrong B it was a bird@). 21 Often, though, especially as concerns, not the >methods' and results of simple perception but, say, those of scientific inquiry, it's hard to know how well we're doing, veritistically speaking; here, we encounter veritistic failure as often as success; and the discovery of such failure tends to be backward-looking B we tend to see that we were wrong in either our beliefs or our methods only once we've moved on to different ones.
Goldman addresses this sort of concern in Chapter 3, giving examples in which subjects are able to select the veritistically best practice, even when they start out using different means of choosing among the available alternatives (81-2). As Goldman notes, however, it's a feature of these examples that the subjects know what the prior probability that a candidate practice (/expert) will get it right is; and this, Goldman admits, is a Acondition that may be met only infrequently@ (82, note 8 Of course, for Goldman, both Longino's criteria and good rules of argumentation derive their epistemic value from their tending (we think) towards true belief. The issue, though, is whether, in a given instance, that feature of a candidate practice will be available to us. If not, then in discussing a feasible VSE, perhaps justification and more >procedural' considerations should have a place at, or near, the centre of KSW. Then again, insofar as Goldman's book contains both an implicit externalistic justification requirement, and at least the resources for an account of the proper role of internalistic justification in VSE, perhaps they already do.
